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WADE HAMPTON: CONFLICTED LEADER 
OF THE CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY? 
Fritz P. Hamer 
In April 1877, Wade Hampton Ill, Confederate military 
hero and now political "savior," declared to a Columbia crowd 
on his return from Washington that they should "forget we are 
Democrats or Republicans, white or colored, and remember only 
that we are all South Carolinians."1 Although Hampton may have 
used some political hyperbole to soothe a fractious electorate, the 
now undisputed governor of the Palmetto State wanted to convince 
the white Democracy that blacks, most of them fonner slaves, 
should be allowed to participate in the political process. Of course, 
the litmus test for this to happen had to be that African Americans 
repudiate the Republican Party. This party. which in the minds of 
most South Carolina whites had corrupted and nearly ruined the 
state since 1866. had championed the rights of the former slaves. 
While white Democrats appeared united in their hatred of the 
Radical Republican regimes of Reconstruction, their rule had ended 
in 1877. Now Hampton offered an olive branch, of sorts, to those 
whom he had reviled for over a decade. 
Most of Hampton's Democratic allies supported the former 
general's overtures since they expected that African Americans 
would have few alternatives. But some allies of Hampton in 1876 
disagreed. Fonner Confederate officers Matthew C. Butler and 
Martin Gary. for example, had no patience for reconciliation with 
blacks. The battle for the state government-for the very integrity 
of a white South Carolina in their minds- was to eliminate all 
opponents. white and black. Foremost among these were the 
I Quoted in Walter Brian Cisco, Wade Hampton. Confederate Warrior, Conser-
\'ative Statesman (Washington. DC: 8rassey's, 2004), 266. The author wishes to 
thank Jennifer Fitzgerald, a colleague al the South Carolina State Museum, for 
reading this paper and providing valuable comments and suggestions. 
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reviled Republicans, but more generally, they sought to squelch the 
political participation of all non-whites. Did Hampton believe his 
prestige and personal qualities to be strong enough that he could 
overcome such powerful hatreds, or was his Columbia rhetoric just 
that, something to offer the opposition until he and his lieutenants 
could eliminate them completely from the political arena? This 
paper will review Hampton 's motives and relationships up to the 
election of 1876 and argue that perhaps there was a little of both. 
But in the fina l analysis, Hampton represented white resurgence and 
retrenchment, and whi le he may have believed that fonner slaves 
could be a part of the political process, it was only on the terms of 
Hampton and his white lieutenants. In their minds only whites had 
the ability, indeed the very right, to govern the state. But to find out 
what led Hampton to his Redeemer leadership role in the crucial 
election of 1876, one must first review his background.2 
Until secession, Hampton had done little to suggest that he 
would be embroi led in contentious politics. Although his grandfather 
had held prestigious military posts, first in the Revolution and later 
in the War of 1812, and his father had also attained distinction in the 
latter war, the family's focus was to attain land, slaves and wealth. 
When Wade fIT was born in 1818, he became part of one of the most 
privi leged fami lies in the American South. The Hampton fami ly 
already controlled vast acreage in the South Carolina midlands, 
owned hundreds of slaves, and made millions growing cotton. They 
had few social or economic peers. Wade Hampton rn was not just a 
wealthy son of a prominent fami ly, but well educated and traveled, 
having attained a degree from South Carolina College and toured 
extensively in Europe and the Northeast during his young adult life. 
Nonetheless, his most important station in life was to become a 
successful plantation manager who would direct a vast estate of 
cotton lands from which great wealth would continue to be derived. 
In 1843 he began to manage the family plantation in Mississippi that 
included twelve thousand acres and nearly one thousand enslaved 
2 Ibid., 275-276. 
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workers. Between these holdings and those in the midlands of 
South Carolina, Hampton traveled regularly to manage both. His 
favorite activities, hunting and fishing, could also be acquitted in 
such endeavors. Like his father and grandfather, Wade III viewed 
politics as a secondary role in society that he re luctant ly assumed. 
Richland District constituents elected him to the South Carolina 
House of Representatives for the first time in 1852, and six years 
later, the same voters elevated him to the state senate. In neither 
chamber did he distinguish himself, rarely speaking while serving 
on legislative committees on federal relations, agriculture, and 
redistricting. Not unti l his last years in the antebellum legislature 
did he even speak out on major issues. In short it seems that he 
served in the State House because his social position requ ired it.3 
Such modest political ambitions began to change, as the 
rift between North and South grew more intense at the end of the 
1850s. Hampton spoke out against John Brown's raid on Harpers 
Feny in the fall of 1859, warning that if the North did not condemn 
the radical abolitionist the Union could not survive. Although he 
did not lead the charge, when Lincoln became the Republican 
presidential nominee, the South Carolina planter supported plans 
for a secession convention if the Illinois lawyer were elected. He 
not only voiced his support for such a body but also joined the 
Minutemen, groups of men in communities around the state that 
supported secession prior to the elections. Throughout the fa ll 
campaign season, these groups held public demonstrations in their 
own regalia and wrote a manifesto supporting secession. In the 
wake of Lincoln's election victory, Hampton continued to support 
the call ing of a convention although he was not elected to that body. 
When the state seceded, Hampton immediately offered his services 
to defend the newly independent "nation." But in the midst of the 
J Ibid., 10-12, 17, 23, 29, 3 1. 46; Wade Hampton III to E. Ham, I January 1877, 
in Hampton Family Pape':'S. South Caroliniana Library, University of South Car-
olina. hereafter noted as HFP; N. Louise Bailey. Mary L. Morgan. and Caro lyn 
R. Taylor, Biographical Direcloryofth e South Carolina Senate, 1776-1985, vol. 
I (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1986),656-9. 
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crisis, as South Carolina faced off against the federal goverrunent 
over the status of Fort Sumter at the mouth of Charleston barbor, 
Hampton left th~ state in March 1861 to check his holdings in 
Mississippi. It was upon his return to the Palmetto State two weeks 
after Fort Sumter surrendered that Hampton began to organize 
his now famous legion. Not only its founder, the planter-turned-
soldier became the legion's financier, using his vast wealth to pay 
for its soldiers ' uniforms, equipment, and firearms. By late spring 
the Confederate high command ordered Hampton 's Legion north to 
defend the newly anointed capital of Richmond, Virginia,4 
Hampton 's many exploits as a military leader, first of his 
legendary Hampton's Legion and then as cavalry commander, 
are we ll known. After the Confederate armies reorganized in the 
spring of 1862, the legion was split up and its commander became 
a subordinate under the renowned cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart. 
Upon this legendary figure 's death in May 1864, Hampton's 
di stinguished service and abilities led to his promotion as Stuart 's 
successor as commander of all Confederate cavalry in the Anny 
of Northern Virginia. Owing his long and distinguished service, 
the South Carolinian received many wounds in daring attacks 
against Federal cavalry and infantry from Manassas to Gettysburg 
to Petersburg. In the last months of the war Hampton went home 
in a doomed attempt to stop William T. Shennan's march through 
the Carolinas. Loyal and determined to war 's end, Hampton 's 
resilience seems more tragic because of his own personal losses. 
First, his brother Frank fell mortally wounded at Brandy Station 
in June 1863. Then, more than a year later, his son Preston was 
killed in an engagement near Petersburg. To compound these tragic 
deaths, at the war's end Hampton's family home at Millwood,just 
outside Columbia, was burned to the ground by Shennan's troops. 
His holdings in Mississippi , including three steam cotton gins and 
4,700 bales of cotton, were also lost. Perhaps Hampton 's greatest 
capital loss, however, was the more than one thousand enslaved 
4 Cisco, Wad~ Hampton, 5 1-52. 
- -- --------- - - ---
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workers who now were free . The state's most distinguished 
Confederate military commander, in spite of all his dedication to the 
Southern cause, found himself virtually destitute financia ll y, if not 
emotionally.S Despite his best efforts, Hampton could only recover 
a small portion of his holdings following his declared bankruptcy 
in 1868. 
In the midst of such personal and capital losses Hampton 
was slow to accept the new social and political order dawning on 
post~war South Carolina. Although he rejected emigration to South 
America Of Europe as some of his fonner ~onfederate comrades 
had done, he was slow to reconcile himself to the Confederacy's 
demise. In the summer of 1866, he told his fonner cornmander-
in-chief, Robert E. Lee, that "J am not reconstructed yet . .. " and 
declared to him, ''Time will prove that you have not fought in 
vain."6 Clearly. Hampton would not easi ly concede that four years 
of bloodshed and personal loss had been a national and personal 
waste. 
As the defeated fonnerConfederate tried to cope with his own 
personal loss, the political and economic changes occurring within 
hi s state became more alarming. For a brief period it appeared that 
former Confederates would be able to resume the reigns of power 
with the blessings of President Andrew Johnson. But a Republican 
Congress soon refused to accept Johnson's lenient terms for the 
fonner Confederacy and reversed Presidential Reconstruction with 
a series of laws in 186~ . Instead, they imposed severe restrictions 
on most of the old leadership and required the Southern states to 
accept former slaves as equals in politica l and social arenas fo r the 
fi rst time. This was an affront, if not worse, to most whites and they 
soon showed their opposition. 
Hampton expressed this bitterness to President Andrew 
Johnson in detail. He denounced what he perceived as a vindictive 
~ Ibid., 55· 163; Charles E: Cauthen, ed., Family Lellersofthe Three Wade Hamp· 
tons, 1782- 1901 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1953), 113·4; 
Wade Hampton III [0 E. Ham, 1 January 1877, HFP. 
6 Wade Hampton 11110 R.E. Lee, typescript, 21 July 1866, HFP. 
94 WADE HAMPTON III 
Congress that was led by Radical Republicans who usurped their 
authority and ignored the Constitution by forcing the Southern 
states to adopt the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments without 
due deliberation of their respective leaders. To Hampton, the 
amendments w.ere forced upon the South ill egally. Somehow he 
could not accept that Congress responded to thwart the South 
Carolina legislature who had passed a series of "Black Codes" the 
previous year tbat severely restricted the movement of freedmen 
and essentially returned them to the life of servitude that they had 
recent ly left. Nor could Hampton see the purpose of what he viewed 
as a corrupt Freedmen's Bureau and "a horde of barbarians- your 
brutal negro troops" that imposed law and order in the South. 
Such organizations were an affront to whites, especially to former 
slaveholders who were accustomed to virtual life and death mastery 
over blacks. Such a response was narural for men like Hampton 
who had been raised to believe that only they had the ability and 
the right to govern the affairs of their state. That former slaves 
were now free men to whom Congress had given political rights 
was unfathomable to Hampton. Such a monolithic shift in social 
strucrure was incomprehensible, even if his beloved South was 
defeated. 7 
His bitterness slowly waned in the fo llowing months but 
Hampton remained "true to his upbringing as a planter and fanner 
slaveholder. Even though he advocated limited political rights for 
freedmen he advised his white friends that they could still control the 
state legislature by controlling the black vote. As in the antebellum 
era, Hampton and most of his class could not conceive that former 
slaves had the ability to behave rationally in the political arena. 
Former slaveholders believed that freedmen were still imbued with 
the traits rel~gating them to subservience, just as they had been in 
slavery. African Americans needed people like Hampton to instruct 
and prevent them from hanning themselves. Such a conclus ion came 
from the paternalistic, racist view that blacks were unable to think 
1 Caulhen, Family Letters, 126-141 . 
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for themselves or recognize their own best interests. By 1867 he told 
lohn Conner, a fellow South Carolinian and Confederate veteran, 
that it was the duty of " every Southern man" to secure the "good will 
and confidence of the negro." It was even acceptable to send blacks 
to Congress since Hampton considered them more trustwonhy than 
"renegades or Yankees," provided that "respectable negroes" were 
recruited. Presumably this meant freedmen whom whites knew 
could be relied upon, whether by bribery or intimidation, to accept 
and serve Southern whites in a loyal- i.e., subordinate--manner.8 
The assumptions of Hampton and his associates were sorely 
tested during the following decade as the battle with Republican 
rule in the state ebbed and flowed. First, most white voters tried 
to forestall the election of delegates to a new state Constitutional 
Convention mandated by Congress. Since a majority of the state's 
registered electorate had to ratify the call of such a convention, 
a large number of white voters registered their protest by not 
casting their ballots on election day in November 1867. Despite 
this unity, the vast majority of registered black voters--eighty-five 
percent- who voted for such a body were enough to validate the 
e lections fo r the Constitutional Convention that met two months 
later. Not surprisingly its majority of black delegates drafted a new 
constitution that ushered in tax and land refonn, the first fonnal 
public education system and more. 
Nonetheless the former cavalry leader continued to believe 
that whites could influence enough freedmen so that Democratic 
conservatives could control the .legislature when the next round 
of fall elections occurred. But Hampton's assumptions proved 
false. The Radical Republicans won a significant majority and 
began to implement their reform agenda- including raising taxes. 
implementing land redistribution, and installing a grassroots public 
B Wade Hampton tIl to John Connor, typescript, 24 March 1868, HFP. For the 
general att itude towards blacks by most whites in the state after 1865, one of the 
best overviews is ·Stephen Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman and (he Reconstruction oj 
White Supremacy (Chapel Hill : University of North Caroli na Press, 2000), 41 , 
44. 
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education system. These bold moves threatened white conservatives 
who feared losing control of black labor and the political process, 
the latter to a Republican Party with majority black support. Most 
white leaders believed that they had to prevent this and take back 
the reigns of power to forestall political and social chaos. Although 
some whites, even Hampton for a time, advocated some form of 
peaceful accommodation with the Republicans, most believed that 
only intimidation and violence could prevail and resurrect white 
control. Martin Gary and Matthew C. Butler characterized the dire 
nature of this new struggle as an attempt by Republicans to place 
the "negro over the white man" a maneuver that demonstrated 
Republicans were "at war with the noblest instincts of our [white] 
race." Conservative radicals such as Butler believed that whites who 
tried to reach political accommodation with fonner slaves were badly 
misled, ifnot traitors to their race. Butler and his supporters, known 
as "straight outs," began a campaign of intimidation and violence 
to attain victory for conservative Democrat s. Such violence ranged 
from beatings to murder, with one of the more extreme cases being 
the assassination of a black leader, Benjamin Randolph. In Octoher 
1868, while campaigning in Abbeville for a seat in the legislature, 
several shots rang out in the local train station, killing Randolph 
instantly. Yet even in this violent atmosphere blacks and thei r white 
allies went to the polls in November to elect a Radical ticket.9 
Hampton could not legally run for polit ical office because 
Congress barred high-ranking Confederate offi cers from public 
service, yet his work behind the scenes was not impeded by the 
Republican victory of November 1868. Since his prediction that 
whites could control the black vote had failed he seemed to discard 
hi s hopes.in that arena. Instead, Hampton tacitly supported the Klan 
9 For the failed effort to forestall the election of delegates to the state constitu-
tion in November 1867, see Walter Edgar, South Carolina : A History (Colum-
bia: University of South Carolina Press, \998), 385-86. For the division among 
whites in 1868 and the violent plan led by people like Gary, sec Richard Zucuk, 
Stat~ of R~b~lIion : R~COl1Struction in South Carolina (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1996), 51 . 
A SYMPOSIUM 97 
violence that accelerated in the wake of the 1868 elections. Primarily 
in the Upstate, bands of vigilantes, often clad in frightening regalia, 
intimidated and attacked Republican supporters, white and black, 
with impunity. Unable to end the violence, Republican Governor 
Robert K. Scott appealed to the president and Congress for Federal 
troops to help stem the carnage. After the president invoked the 
Third Enforcement Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, in April 1871, Federal troops soon arrested several hundred 
suspected Klansmen. Even though Hampton publicly spoke out 
against the violence, he nonetheless led a su~scription effort on 
behalf of the accused for their legal defense. Although at least one 
historian has called the federal law timid and asserted that it should 
have been imposed earlier and more forcefully, the action ended 
most of the violence. Hundreds were incarcerated and trials were 
held. Unfortunately for the federal authorities, so many suspects 
turned themselves in, along with those captured, that the courts and 
jails could not process the huge backlog that was created in the legal 
system. This, coupled with the expert defenses that the accused 
received through the moral support and financial backing of people 
such as Hampton and Matthew C. Butler, meant that only a token 
number of accused Klansmen received convictions. Even those that 
did generally received light prison sentences. Although this spate 
of violence came to an end, the lull proved to be temporary. As the 
elections of the fall of 1876 began in earnest, white conservative 
elements re-ignited their campaign of intimidation and violence. 
And this lime Hampton led the effort by running for governor. I 0 
Although former Confederates at all levels were given 
amnesty by Congress in 1872, Hampton had remained too 
preoccupied with family issues and his poor finances to take a 
leadership role in the fight against the Radical Republicans. His 
10 For the support Hampton gave the Klansmen indicted, see Zuczek, State o/Re-
bellion, 100. For the violence perpetrated by the organization, see Zuczek, State 
0/ Rebellion, 94-100; and Cisco, Wade Hampton, 204-206. Also see Lou Falkner 
Williams, The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871- 1872 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996),53. 
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efforts to improve his financial condition collapsed when the 
insurance company he joined went into bankruptcy less than a year 
after his appointment to its board. Still, he maintained a keen interest 
in the political future of his home state. Thus, when ex-Confederate 
leaders approached him in June 1876 to be the Democratic Party 's 
nominee for governor, he accepted,ll 
Hampton's social position and heroic role as a Confederate 
leader made him tbe best standard bearer for the conservative 
Democrats. Unanimously nominated in an August convention, the 
soldier-turned-politician began a campaign across the state, from 
the Upcountry to tpe Lowcountry, defending the virtues of his party 
and castigating the conupt and spendthrift ways of the Radical 
Republicans. But Hampton's speeches and his obvious public 
appeal as a hero of the defeated Confederacy were possible largely 
because of the political army-mounted Red Shirts- that bolstered 
his appeal and protected him in every community to which he took 
his campaign. 
In Anderson, Sumter, Winnsboro and Yorkville during 
the fall campaign Hampton was met by an impressive entourage 
of local dignitaries, admiring young ladies and scores, sometimes 
hundreds, of mounted Red Shirts. For one campaign rally in 
Winnsboro on October 16, 1876, an elaborate itinerary was created 
and fliers posted throughout the community. It outlined where the 
local Democratic dignitaries were to stand, the place of "colored 
clubs" and how the "mounted men" should arrange themselves so 
that "colored people of both parties" could be admitted in front of 
them. In Yorkville a grand parade met Hampton at the train station 
liOn Congressional amnesty for former Confederates, see Eric Foner, Recon· 
struction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, /863-1877 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1988),504. For Hampton's tragic personal and financial problems in this 
period, SCI! Cisco, Wade Hampton, 198-201 ,2 10-11. And for Hampton's rel uctant 
acceptance of the Democratic nomination for govcrnor, sec typescript narration, 
July 25, 1876, HFP; and Walter Allen, Governor Chamberlain s Administration 
in South Carolina: A Chapter of Reconstruction in the Southern States (New 
York: a.p. Putnam's Sons, 1888), 400. For Hampton's reluctance to run in the 
1876 gubernatorial race, see Cisco, 217, 223 
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and rumed out for the Democratic nominee 's stump speech where 
he appealed not only to whites but also to blacks. After castigating 
the corrupt Republicans in Columbia and their governor, Daniel 
Chamberlain, for the umpteenth time, he appealed for black support. 
Ironically Hampton claimed that blacks had become "slaves to your 
political masters" and that to be "freemen they must leave the Loyal 
League" and join with him to bring "free speech, free ballot, a free 
press." And yet just a decade before most blacks had been slaves 
for life to Hampton and his class, devoid of any rights whatsoever. 
Fear prevented many minority voters from asserting the courage to 
openly disagree with Red Shirts ready to pounce on any dissenters 
in the crowd. Except in the LowcounLry, where blacks outnumbered 
whites, few of these grand political rallies allowed the opposition to 
rebut Hampton's c1aims.12 
In spite of Hampton 's appeals on the stump and his 
professed opposition to campaign violence, his Red Shirt supporters 
ruthlessly used intimidation and violence throughout the Upstate to 
suppress Republican opposition. One Laurens County Republican 
group appealed to Governor Chamberlain for protection because no 
one "dares to speak nor act with respect of his franchise privileges 
without being in extreme danger." Individual acts of violence 
sometimes expanded into major battles that led to injury and death 
on a large scale. Just as the campaign began in earnest, the Ellenton 
riots of September 1876 saw black militia carry on a running battle 
with Red Shirt companies for almost two days before Federal 
troops intervened to end the carnage. At least fifty blacks and one 
white Red Shirt lay dead at its conclusion. Similarly at Cainhoy, 
iri the Lowcountry. blacks and whites faced off again. Here the 
black militia got the better of the action but still whites inflicted 
nearly as many casualties on the Republicans before they fled . With 
such brutal violence .going on all around him, Hampton seemed to 
12 For details about the Hampton political rallies, see "Celebration in Honor of 
General Wade Hampton at Winnsboro," 16 October 1876. HFP; and Yorkville 
Enquirer. October 19. 1876. The author wishes to thanIc. Debra Franklin, Mu· 
sewn researcber, for taking extensive notes of the latter for tbis srudy. 
.... ,- .. _---_._--- ---------
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remain above the fray, arguing before black audiences why they 
should support his election. Through an alliance with the whites, 
"who owned the land ... pay the taxes," blacks could help redeem 
the state. But, he warned, if they continued with their "carpet-bag 
friends (the Republicans]" they would lose aid or support when 
needed, presumably from whites. I) 
Some former slaves seemed to take Hampton's words to 
heart because, as Edmund Drago shows in his recent study, the 
white Red Shirt clubs had black allies. According to this historian, 
there were at least eighteen black Democratic Clubs organized 
during the 1876 political campaign. How many of these clubs 
actually were formed by political coercion from whites or from 
genuine disillusionment by blacks with the Republican leadership 
is difficult to determine. Evidence gathered by Drago suggests that 
these black organizations had members that joined for a variety 
of reasons, some from conviction, others out of necessity. Some 
African Americans felt that even if the Democrats were not their 
best political allies they did not think. that the Republican Party 
could protect them. Consequently in order to continue living and 
working in their communities some fonner slaves believed they 
needed to gain favors from white Democrats that would protect and 
sustain them during and after the elections. 14 
Although bhick Red Shirts did exist, it is clear that most 
African Americans remained loyal to the Republican Party despite 
the growing divisions within its ranks during the campaign. And 
for those minority voters that switched their allegiance, most faced 
severe rebuke from fellow blacks, including their wives. Within 
most black communities such betrayal often led to expulsion from 
the household and sometimes even physical assaults. Nonetheless, 
13 Zuczek, State of Rebellion, 176-78; Dewitt Grant Jones, "Wade Hampton and 
Ihe Rhetoric of Race: A Study of the Speaking of Wade Hampton on the Race 
Issue in South Carolina, 1865-1878,'- (PhD diss., Louisiana State University, 
1988), 144-45. 
14 Edmund L. Drago, Hurrahfor Hampton : Black Red Shirts in South Carolina 
During Reconstruction (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998), 16, 
22-34. 
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white intimidation by the Red Shirts and their allies was far greater. 
Even so, the results at the polls were very close when the November 
ballots were tall ied. Although the conservative Democrats had a lead 
of just over one thousand votes across the state, this was initially 
nullified by the vote count in Laurens and Edgefield Counties. In 
these two districts, county commissioners reported voter fraud 
where Democrats received more votes than actual voters available. 
This began the long stalemate over who had won the election. For 
the next several months RepUblicans and Democrats both claimed 
victory.IS 
Hampton declared himself the winner and demanded that 
his Republican opponent step down. Backed by Federal troops, 
Chamberlain refused, almost leading to a bloody riot during the 
last days of November 1876 as both Republican and Democratic 
legislators declared victo ry for themselves and proceeded to occupy 
the same chamber in the South Carolina State House. Led by dual 
speakers, E. W. M. Mackey for the Republicans and William H. 
Wallace for the Democrats. a tense atmosphere continued for four 
days with both sides refusing to leave the chambers. 
Surrounded by Federal troops, on the morning of the fourth 
day the Democrats reluctantly voted to leave voluntarily when the 
troops outside seemed poised to remove them by force. However, as 
this occurred. disgruntled whites had begun to arrive in Columbia 
from many areas of the state to gather around the still unfinished 
State House, seemingly bent on throwing out the Republican 
members regardless of the Federal troops. Before violence could 
break out, Hampton showed his true leadership. Appearing before 
IS For a review of the vote tallies and the stalemate that ensued see Zuczek. State 
of Rebellion, 193. For black attempts to switch to the Democratic side and how 
insignificant this actually was see Jocl Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in 
South Carolina During Recorutruction. /861-/877 (Chapel Hill : University of 
North Carolina Press, 1965),408-41 2. Nevertheless. Cisco tries to claim that 
many blacks did switch to the Dcmocrats: see Cisco, Wad~ Hampton, 232-34. 
Also see Richard M. Gergel, "Wadc Hampton and the Rise of One Party Racial 
Orthodoxy in South Carolina," The Proceedings a/the South Carolina Historical 
Association (1977). 6-9. 
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the mob, he requested that they di sperse. As they did S0, the authority 
of Hampton was obvious and the legitimacy of the Republican 
governor and his party was irrevocably compromised. 16 
Yet while Chamberlain tried to hang on with the aid of 
Federal troops and Congressional backing, Hampton had enough 
public support to have himself inaugurated governor even though 
he lacked the legal authority. in December 1876 Hampton declared 
in his acceptance speech that he owed much of hi s success to black 
voters who "rose above prejudice o f race and [were] honest enough to 
throw ofTthe shackles of party." Yet even though Hampton publicly 
claimed this support, others in hi s own party reali zed that it was the 
bands of Red Shirts, with their intimidation tactics and recourse to 
violence, who had really "won" the election for him. On election 
day in one Lexington precinct, a Democratic observer admitted that 
only ten blacks voted the conservative ticket. Although it is difficult 
to say how many blacks actually voted Democratic across the state, 
one hi storian estimates that probably no more than one hundred 
blacks in each county voted for Hampton and his party.17 
Nonetheless, even without substantial black support, 
Hampton eventually forced his Republican rival to resign his 
office. As he and Chamberlain di sputed each other's legitimacy 
into the spring of 1877, the hopes of RepUblicans that somehow 
the Radical ticket could sti 11 win grew ever dimmer. Hampton and 
his Red Shirts advised supporters to pay taxes to the Democracy, 
not Columbia, so that the Republican regime could not operate the 
daily duties of government. In fact , the power of the conservative 
Democracy had grown so that just before Chamberlain resigned his 
office in April 1877, Hampton reputedly claimed that if the fonner 
governor had not given up his office he would have had every tax 
16 For an account of the stalemate in the State House after the election see Cisco, 
Wade Hampton, 250-2. 
17 For an account of Hampton's inaugural address and its content see Charleston 
News and Courier, December 14, 1876, extra edition, HFP; and Cisco, Wade 
Hampton, 256-8. For estimates on the number of black voters that supported 
Hampton see Williamson, After Slavery, 411. 
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collector in the state hanged. But the final chapter in Republican 
rule only ended after Hampton visited the president in Washington. 
There, after he assured the newly inaugurated Rutherford B. Hayes 
that he would guarantee political rights and protection to blacks as 
well as whites, regardless of party, the president agreed to pull out 
all remaining Federal troops from the state. With federal protection 
now gone, Chamberlain had no other recourse but to resign his 
office and leave the state. IS 
With Hampton and the Democrats finally undisputed 
victors, the fonner cavalry hero continued to claim that he regarded 
both races as equals before the law and that African Americans 
should enjoy the same political rights and protections as whites. 
Perhaps the Redeemer governor truly believed this but some, if not 
most, of his lieutenants did not. Just as they had directed the Red 
Shirt campaign, Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary demanded that 
every white voter make sure that he intimidated every black voter 
he knew to either vote Democratic, or not at all, through whatever 
means he had. They were detennined to use any means at thei r 
disposal 10 elect Hampton and throw out the Republicans.19 
Whether Hampton considered that racial dominance was the 
essence of the struggle or not, it is obvious that he viewed blacks as 
second-class citizens who could only participate in politics under 
white supervision. Old Confederates such as M. C. Butler were 
detennined to eradicate black political participation, regardless 
of who might supervise black voters. Although Butler's extreme 
position- advocating the removal of African Americans from the 
State House and all local offices as well- failed in the early post· 
Reconstruction era, over time black political participation was 
steadily eroded. It started within months of Hampton assuming 
undisputed office in the spring of 1877. In Richland County, 
Senator Beverly Nash and State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan 
18 On the claim by Hampton, see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 267. For the end of 
Chamberlain's tenure, see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 266·9. 
19 For more, see especially William J. Cooper, The Conservative Regime: South 
Carolina, /877- /890 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). 
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Wright were forced to resign their offices by the fall of 1877 after 
trumped-up charges of corruption and drunkenness were brought 
against them. By the early I 880s most blaek politicians resigned 
even if they weren't directly threatened, once they realized how 
tenuous their own position in the white-dominated government 
had become. But a few Afiican Americans held onto their offices 
through the 1880s because they came from predominately black 
counties. Yet even the few who clung to political office had little 
but symbolic impact on policy. By the 1890s, white supremacy 
would be complete and remained so for nearly a century.20 
As for Hampton, his political leadership continued to have 
impact through the 1878 election. He worked to improve funding 
for the budding public education system created by the Republicans 
and expend itures per pupil continued to ri se for both blacks and 
whites through the decade of the 1880s under those who succeeded 
Hampton. But while Hampton 's legacy for equal education 
appeared genuine, that for equality in the political process never 
did . Constitutional offices during the Hampton years became all 
white. 
In addition to legal ways of excluding African-American 
voters from exercising their rights at the ballot box, the former 
general's party lieutenants also found ways to stuffballots and restrict 
minority voters through literacy tests and grandfather clauses. And 
not only did Hampton oversee new voting rights restrictions, he 
did little to support the few remaining African Americans in local 
20 On Wright 's removal from office. sec Richard Gergel and Belinda Gergel, 
'''To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden ': Associate Justice Jonathon Jas· 
per Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina," in At Freedom 's Door, Afri. 
can American Founding Falhers and Lawyers in Reconstruction South Carolina, 
ed. James Lowell Underwood and W. Lewis Burke, Jr. (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2000), 64-7. On Beverly Nash's remova l, see John Ham-
mond Moore, Columbia and Richland County: A S()uth Carolina Community, 
1740-J990 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 265·6. For the 
general campaign used by Hamplon and his allies to remove most blacks from 
office, see Moore, Columbia and Richland County, 267. For a comprehensive 
examination of the removal of blacks from politics in the I 880s, see Cooper, The 
Conservative Regime, 90-107. 
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offices, even if they were Democrats. The few that gained local 
offices did not keep them long after Hampton left to become United 
States Senator in 1879.21 
In 1878 Hampton was elected to a second term as governor 
but plans were already afoot to send him to Washington where his 
influence on state politics would be minimized. Although the war 
hero's prestige as a Redeemer leader would survive as a symbol of 
white supremacy over the hated Radical regime, his presence on the 
political stage was no longer essential to white political dominance. 
Now over sixty, Hampton 's age was probably affecting his ability. 
And there were younger leaders, some former Confederates, who 
were ready to take over the reigns ofreal political control. In late 
1878, fo llowing a serious hunting accident, Hampton's very survival 
seemed precarious. The conservative regime that Hampton had 
returned to power in 1877 continued to maintain political control 
through most of the 1880s, but their days were numbered as Ben 
Tillman's star began to rise. 
Even though the hero and leader of the 1876 election survived 
his accident and continued his political career in Washington for 
another decade, Hampton became largely a symbol of the old 
guard whose i~uence on state politics was steadily eroded. While 
respected by most of his colleagues in the U. S. Congress, Hampton's 
tenure had little significance for the state or the narion. He rarely 
spoke to the assembled body and often missed sessions because 
of illness or infinnity. By the end of the 1880s, even his symbolic 
va1ue to the state's young Turks, led by Tillman, was finished. At 
the end of the decade the state senate voted him out ofoffice.22 
Hampton lived for another decade struggling to support his 
family while attending Confederate reunions inside and outside the 
21 On Hampton's short tenure as governor and his modest success in carrying out 
his election promises to blacks, see Kantrowitz, Ben 7Ulman, 78·79; Williamson, 
After Slavery, 412-17; .and Cooper, The Conservative Regime, 90, 96, 11 1- 12. 
Also see Gergel, "Wade Hampton," 9-14. 
22 On Hampton's health and waning influence see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 270-
324; and Kantrowitz, Ben TIllman , 91 -4, 185. 
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state when his health pennitted. When he died in April 1902, he 
was praised for his determination and bravery as a soldier who did 
all in his power to protect his state during four years of war. There 
is no denying that he was one of the last of the old cavaliers who 
fought ferociously for his state, but his political leadership during 
and after Reconstruction is not so clear. While Hampton continued 
to fight for his state, he did so from the perspective of an old guard 
trying to return the state to some semblance of its pre-war days . 
Steeped in the old white planter view of society where blacks 
and most whites accepted the planter oligarchy without question, 
Hampton envisioned an ordered world, as he perceived it had been 
before secession. Although he opposed violence after Appomattox, 
he sti ll acquiesced in the Red Shirt campaign of 1876. 
Even though he continued to claim that he had garnered a 
significant number of black votes to win back the state in 1876, most 
white supporters from that election later admitted that Hampton 
was misled. According to Ben Tillman, reflecting on these events 
years later, despite Hampton's claim that he had won sixteen 
thousand votes from black constiruents in 1876, « ... every active 
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken." A 
noble soldier, Wade Hampton was at best a resolute but reactionary 
politician. While he was willing to accept blacks in the political 
arena, it could only be on white tenns. 
Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Hampton accepted 
white methods of intimidation and violence to save the state from 
what he and other white leaders considered chaos under a black 
dominated Republican Party. He, like most whites, believed that 
the best option for all , black and white, was a paternalistic society 
that controlled the economic and political course of the state. To 
Hampton, equitable distribution of political power and economic 
freedom for recently freed slaves was a recipe for disaster. His 
philosophy and upbringing made his political career one of reaction 
and retrenchment. 23 
23 Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman, 78·79. Kantrowitz argues persuasively that Hamp-
ton's patemalistic view of race was really little different from the violence which 
Ben Tillman and M. C. Butler advocated in 1876. [n the end both sides believed 
that the only conceivable order of society was for whites 10 dominate blacks. 
